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1. Introduction 
An intense debate has been taking place in recent years about the extent to which 
firms’ investment is constrained by the availability of finance, and more specifically, 
about whether a positive and statistically significant relationship between investment 
and cash flow can be seen as an indicator of financial constraints (see Schiantarelli, 
1995; Hubbard, 1998; and Bond and Van Reenen, 2005, for surveys).  
The debate has been almost entirely based on data from firms quoted on the 
stock market. Yet, financial constraints on quoted firms are likely to be relatively 
weak, as these firms are typically large, long-established, financially healthy 
companies with good credit ratings. A sharper test of the effects of financial 
constraints on investment would be obtained from a sample that included a large 
number of unquoted firms, which are more likely to be characterized by adverse 
financial attributes such as poor solvency, a short track record, and low real assets 
compared to quoted firms. 
Accordingly, in the present study, we attempt to shed further light on the 
debate by using, for the first time, a large panel of financial data on UK firms, over 99 
percent of which are not quoted on the stock market. Specifically, we estimate, both 
separately and jointly, the effects of “internal” financial constraints (availability of 
internal funds) and “external” financial constraints (access to external finance) on 
firms’ investment. Using firms’ cash flow and coverage ratio as measures of the 
former, and firms’ size and age as proxies for the latter, we find that the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow responds differently according to the type of constraint. The 
sensitivity is particularly large when external constraints are strong and internal 
constraints are weak. This suggests that investment by successful young, small firms 
may be significantly constrained by access to external finance, which has long been a 
matter of policy concern. 
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. In Section 2, we provide an 
economic background for our analysis. Section 3 contains a description of our data 
set, together with some summary statistics. Section 4 illustrates our baseline 
specification and our estimation methodology. Section 5 presents our main results and 
robustness tests, and Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Economic background 
The debate on whether high sensitivities of investment to cash flow can be interpreted 
as indicators of financial constraints started with Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen’s 
(FHP hereafter) 1988 pioneering paper, according to which firms with low dividend 
payout ratios (i.e. firms that are more likely to face financial constraints) display a 
high sensitivity of investment to cash flow. A number of papers followed, focusing 
not only on firms’ investment behavior, but also on their inventory investment 
(Carpenter et al., 1994, 1998; Kashyap et al., 1994; Guariglia, 1999, 2000; Benito, 
2005), their R&D investment (Bond et al., 1999; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002b), 
their employment decisions (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999; Sharpe, 1994); and more in 
general their growth (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a). These studies generally 
supported FHP’s (1988) main conclusion. 
A significant challenge to FHP’s (1988) work came with Kaplan and Zingales 
(hereafter KZ, 1997). Instead of using the dividend payout ratio as an indicator of 
financial constraints, these authors used other criteria, reclassifying FHP’s low-
dividend sub-sample of firms on the basis of information contained in the firms’ 
annual reports as well as managements’ statements on liquidity. They found that 
investment at firms that appeared less financially constrained by these criteria was 
more, rather than less, sensitive to cash flow than investment at other firms. They 
therefore concluded that higher sensitivities of investment to cash flow cannot be 
interpreted as evidence that firms are more financially constrained. A heated debate 
followed (Cleary, 1999; FHP, 2000; KZ, 2000; Allayannis and Mozumdar, 2004; 
Cleary et al., 2007).  
The different conclusions reached by these two groups of authors can be explained 
by the different ways in which they measured financial constraints. On the one hand, 
most studies that have found results in line with those of FHP (1988) defined financial 
constraints using criteria such as firms’ size, age, dividend payout ratio, or 
information on whether they have a bond rating and/or access to commercial paper. 
These criteria can be seen as proxies of the extent to which firms are susceptible to the 
effects of information asymmetries, which translate themselves in difficulties in 
obtaining external funds (i.e. as proxies for the degree of external financial constraints 
faced by the firms). Smaller and younger firms are particularly susceptible to 
information asymmetry effects, since little public information is available for them, 
and it is more difficult for financial institutions to gather this information. Obtaining 
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external finance is therefore likely to be particularly costly for these firms (Bernanke 
et al., 1996). Similarly, when seeking for external finance, firms with a low dividend-
payout ratio are also likely to be subject to moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems. In an asymmetric information setting, dividends are in fact used by firms to 
convey information to shareholders, and more in general, to the outside world. Firms 
that pay high dividends signal that they have good long-term prospects, while the 
opposite holds for low-dividend paying firms (Bhattacharya, 1979; John and 
Williams, 1985; Miller and Rock, 1985). Once again, obtaining external finance will 
be more difficult for the latter. Finally, variables such as access to the commercial 
paper market and bond rating are used because firms must reach a minimum size, 
collateral level, and age before the additional risk associated with information 
asymmetries is low enough to make bond issuance feasible or to obtain access to the 
commercial paper market (Calomiris et al., 1995). 
On the other hand, the majority of studies that have found results in line with KZ 
(1997), classified firms or observations on the basis of indicators related to the level 
of internally generated funds available to them, which can be seen as a proxy for the 
degree of internal financial constraints that they face. In particular, KZ (1997) based 
their sample separation criteria essentially on variables related to firms’ liquidity 
(which is obviously strongly correlated with the level of internal funds available to 
firms). Similarly, Cleary (1999) used a number of variables strongly related to firms’ 
internal funds (e.g. the current ratio, the coverage ratio etc.) to construct an index of 
firms’ financial strength1. 
These considerations strongly suggest that internal and external financial 
constraints have different effects on the investment-cash flow relationship. One of the 
contributions of this paper is to investigate this issue more in depth. It has to be noted, 
however, that the concepts of internal and external financial constraints may be 
related. A firm with greater internal cash flow may in fact find it easier to obtain 
external finance, as it will be perceived as less risky by lenders, considering that a 
high internal cash flow can be seen as evidence of the firm’s managers’ commitment 
                                                 
1Exceptions are Kadapakkam et al. (1998) and Cleary (2006) who estimated investment equations for a 
number of developed countries, and found that the sensitivities of investment to cash flow are often 
higher for larger firms and firms with higher dividend payout ratios. Yet, as discussed in Islam and 
Mozumdar (2002), their results are likely to be driven by insufficient cross-sectional heterogeneity in 
within-country samples. 
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to their investment projects (Leland and Pyle, 1977). Conversely, firms that are 
internally financially constrained will find it more difficult to obtain external finance. 
The work of Cleary et al. (2007) is most clearly related to ours in that it also 
attempts to distinguish (both theoretically and empirically) between the effects of 
internal and external financial constraints on the sensitivity of investment to cash 
flow. Specifically, Cleary et al. (2007) construct a model showing that this sensitivity 
is determined by the interactions between a cost and a revenue effect. On the one 
hand, the cost effect arises because, assuming that internal funds are high but 
insufficient to finance all of the firm’s investment requirements, higher levels of 
investment are typically associated with higher borrowing, higher repayment costs, 
and, consequently, a higher risk of default. This effect suggests a positive relationship 
between cash flow and investment: a drop in cash flow leads to a drop in investment, 
as this strategy allows the firm to avoid the higher borrowing, higher repayment costs, 
and resulting higher risk of default that would follow from keeping investment 
constant or from increasing it. On the other hand, a revenue effect arises because a 
higher level of investment generates higher revenue, which lowers the firm’s risk of 
default. This effect suggests a negative relationship between cash flow and 
investment. In this case, a drop in cash flow leads to higher investment, as this 
strategy improves the firm’s ability to repay its debt, avoiding bankruptcy, and 
increases the lender’s payoff in case of default. 
Because both cost and revenue effects operate in the economy, and because the 
two effects lead to different predictions about the sensitivity of investment to cash 
flow, the exact relationship between these two variables depends on which of the two 
effects prevails. If the cost effect dominates, then one should observe a positive link 
between investment and cash flow, whereas if the revenue effect dominates, a 
negative link should be observed. According to Cleary et al. (2007), the latter scenario 
takes place for firms characterized by negative (or particularly low) internal funds. 
For these firms, a large share of any loan would have to be used to pay existing debts 
or cover fixed costs, i.e. to try and make cash flow positive. Therefore, in the presence 
of a falling cash flow, these firms would have to increase their investment, in order to 
generate sufficient revenue to achieve this goal. 
The model’s predictions are therefore as follows. If firms are classified on the 
basis of their internal funds (i.e. on the basis of their cash flow, or more in general, of 
the degree of internal financial constraints that they face), then the relationship 
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between investment and cash flow should be U-shaped, with firms characterized by 
negative (or particularly low) cash flow displaying negative investment-cash flow 
sensitivities. If on the other hand, firms are classified on the basis of indicators of the 
capital market imperfections that they face, such as size, age, or bond rating (i.e. 
indicators of asymmetric information, or more in general, of the degree of external 
financial constraints that they face), then the relationship between investment and 
cash flow could be positive or negative depending on whether the cost or the revenue 
effect dominates. The former effect is more likely to dominate if the negative cash 
flow observations are few or totally absent from the sample. The model also predicts 
that when the relationship between investment and cash flow is positive, increased 
informational asymmetry strengthens the investment-cash flow sensitivity. Cleary et 
al. (2007) test their model using data for US quoted firms drawn from Compustat and 
find strong empirical support for it. 
Our work differs from Cleary et al. (2007)’s in four important ways. First, and 
most importantly, while their sample is confined to quoted firms (in the United 
States), which are unlikely to display a wide enough range of financial constraints, 
ours mainly includes unquoted firms. This is important considering that Cleary et al. 
(2007) themselves state that “it is difficult to find good proxies for capital market 
imperfections that vary enough across observations in the sample (especially with 
Compustat data, where all firms are publicly traded).” (p. 31). 
Second, our paper is based on a sample from the United Kingdom. The relative 
lack of corporate bond and commercial paper markets, the relative thin and highly 
regulated banking and equity markets, and the relatively small amount of venture 
capital financing, seem to make the idea of financial constraints that affect firm 
behavior more plausible in a European context than in the US. 
Third, we provide a richer analysis of the effects of internal and external 
constraints: our analysis provides estimates not only of the individual effects that 
internal and external financial constraints have on the sensitivities of firms’ 
investment to cash flow, but also of the effects of various combinations of these two 
types of constraints, trying to identify those combinations leading to higher 
sensitivities.  
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Finally, instead of using a Q model framework to estimate our investment 
regressions, we use error-correction specifications2. The main advantage of using an 
error-correction model (ECM) is that it leads to a more flexible specification than the 
Q approach, which is consequently less likely to suffer from mis-specification 
problems. In particular, contrary to the Q model, the ECM specification maintains the 
long-run properties of value-maximising investment models, but does not impose the 
restrictions on short-run dynamics associated with particular adjustment cost 
specifications. Moreover, using the ECM specification allows us to by-pass to a 
certain extent the criticism according to which cash flow might be an important 
determinant of investment, simply because it accounts for investment opportunities, 
which are poorly measured by Tobin’s Q (Cummins et al., 2006). 
 
3. Main features of the data and summary statistics 
3.1 The data set 
We construct our data set from the profit and loss and balance sheet data gathered by 
Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing in the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) 
database. This provides information on companies for the period 1993-2003. Over 99 
percent of the firms in the data set are not traded on the stock market. The firms in our 
data set operate in a wide range of industrial sectors, namely agriculture, forestry and 
mining; manufacturing; construction; retail and wholesale; hotels and restaurants; and 
business and other services3. Having access to firms operating in sectors other than 
manufacturing is beneficial for us, considering that the majority of studies that looked 
at the effects of financial constraints on firms’ activities have focused essentially on 
the manufacturing sector. Yet, as explained in Bernanke et al. (1996), the share of 
sales by “small” firms is generally greater in other sectors.  
We measure investment (I) as the purchase of fixed tangible assets by the firm. 
Cash flow (CF) is obtained as the sum of the firm’s after-tax profits and depreciation. 
Our measure of the replacement value of capital stock (K) is calculated using the 
standard perpetual inventory formula (Blundell et al., 1992). In particular, we use 
tangible fixed assets as the historic value of the capital stock. We assume that 
replacement cost and historic cost are the same in the first year of data for each firm. 
                                                 
2 Given that our panel includes mainly unquoted firms, it would be impossible to estimate a Q model, 
as Tobin’s Q, which is defined as the market value of the firm over the replacement value of its capital 
stock, cannot be calculated for unquoted firms. 
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We then apply the perpetual inventory formula as follows: Kt+1 = Kt *(1-δ)*(pt+1 /pt )+ 
It, where t indexes time; δ represents the depreciation rate, which we assume to be 
constant and equal to 5.5 percent for all firms; and pt is the price of investment goods, 
which we proxy with the implicit deflator for gross fixed capital formation. 
We exclude companies that changed the date of their accounting year-end by 
more than a few weeks, so that the data refer to 12 month accounting periods. Firms 
that do not have complete records on investment, cash flow, or sales are also dropped, 
as well as firms with less than 3 years of continuous observations. Finally, to control 
for the potential influence of outliers, we exclude observations in the 1 percent tails 
for each of the regression variables. These cut-offs are aimed at eliminating 
observations reflecting particularly large mergers, extraordinary firm shocks, or 
coding errors. These types of rules are common in the literature and we employ them 
to ensure comparability with previous work (Bond et al., 2003; Cummins et al., 2006). 
The data sets that we use in estimation include a total of 39270 annual 
observations on 7534 companies, when we only focus on the manufacturing sector; 
and 124590 annual observations on 24184 companies, when we focus on our broader 
range of industries. Both samples cover the years 1996-2003 and have an unbalanced 
structure, with the number of years of observations on each firm varying between 3 
and 84. By allowing for both entry and exit, the use of an unbalanced panel partially 
mitigates potential selection and survivor bias. 
 
3.2 Sample separation criteria 
We use the level of the cash flow to beginning-of-period capital stock ratio available 
to firms as a proxy for the degree of internal financial constraints that they face, and 
the firms’ size as a proxy for the degree of external financial constraints that they 
face. It is sensible to use cash flow as a proxy for internal funds for two main reasons. 
First, cash flow can take negative values. This is particularly important as according 
to Cleary et al.’s (2007) model, it is for those firms whose internal funds are 
sufficiently negative, that a negative relationship between investment and internal 
                                                                                                                                            
3 Following Cleary et al. (2007), we exclude firms operating in regulated or financial sectors.  
4 See Appendix 1 in Guariglia (2007) for more information on the structure of our panel and more 
complete definitions of all variables used. Also note that because our model includes variables lagged 
up to two times and is estimated in first-differences, the first three cross-sections of the data cannot be 
used in estimation: for this reason, although our original data set covers the period 1993-2003, the data 
set actually used in estimation only covers the years 1996-2003. 
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funds is more likely to be observed. Second, cash flow has been widely used in the 
investment literature as a measure of internal funds (see Schiantarelli, 1995; Hubbard 
et al., 1998, and Bond and Van Reenen, 2005). Yet, cash flow is not a perfect measure 
of internal funds because it is a flow variable, which does not include the stock of 
funds accumulated in the past. One can, however, claim that since cash flow is the 
main source of variation in internal funds, firms with negative cash flow are likely to 
have a low or negative level of internal funds (Cleary et al., 2007). 
We first test whether cash flow has a differential impact on the investment of 
firms with different degrees of internal financial constraints. For this purpose, as in 
Cleary et al. (2007), we initially split firms on the basis of their cash flow to 
beginning-of-period capital stock ratio. We therefore construct the following dummy 
variables: 
i. NEGCFit, which is equal to 1 if firm i has a negative cash flow to capital 
ratio at time t, and equal to 0, otherwise; 
ii. MEDCFit, which is equal to 1 if firm i has a positive cash flow to capital 
ratio in year t, which falls below the 75th percentile of the distribution of the 
corresponding ratios of all the firms operating in the same industry as firm i 
in that particular year, and equal to 0, otherwise; 
iii. HIGHCFit, which is equal to 1 if firm i displays a positive cash flow to 
capital ratio in year t, which falls above the 75th percentile of the distribution 
of the corresponding ratios of all the firms operating in the same industry as 
firm i in that particular year, and equal to 0, otherwise.  
We use these dummies in our investment regressions as interactions on the cash flow 
term. In this way, we allow firms to transit between classes5. 
To check robustness, we also use firms’ financial status dummies defined in a 
similar way as above, but based on their coverage ratio (NEGCOVit; MEDCOVit, 
HIGHCOVit). The coverage ratio is defined as the ratio between firms’ total profits 
before tax and before interest and their total interest payments, and indicates the 
availability of internal funds that firms can use to finance their real activities. As the 
coverage ratio has been widely used in the literature on the effects of financial 
constraints on firms’ activities (see Carpenter et al., 1998; Guariglia, 1999, 2000; and 
                                                 
5 For this reason, our empirical analysis will focus on firm-years rather than simply firms. See Kaplan 
and Zingales (1997) and Guariglia (2000) for a similar approach. The equations that we estimate are 
described in detail in Section 4.1. 
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Whited, 1992), we use this variable as our second measure of firms’ internal funds, 
instead of the net liquidity to capital ratio, which was used by Cleary et al. (2007). 
We then investigate whether cash flow has a different impact on the 
investment of firms facing different degrees of external financial constraints. For this 
purpose, we first partition firms on the basis of their size, measured by their total real 
assets. Smaller firms are likely to face more severe problems of asymmetric 
information as they are more likely to suffer from idiosyncratic risk, and to have 
lower collateral values in relation to their liabilities, as well as higher bankruptcy 
costs, and short track records (Schiantarelli, 1995). Each year, we consider a firm’s 
size in comparison with the situation of other firms in the industry in which that firm 
operates. We define as small firm-years (SMALLit=1) within an industry, those firms 
whose real assets in year t are in the lowest quartiles of the distribution of the assets of 
all the firms in that particular industry and year. Similarly, we define as medium-sized 
firm-years (MEDIUMit=1) within an industry, those firms whose real assets in year t 
fall in the second and third quartiles of the distribution. Finally, large firm-years 
(LARGEit=1) are those firm-years with assets in the highest quartile of the 
distribution.  
To check robustness, we also define the degree of asymmetric information 
faced by our firms in capital markets on the basis of their age, which is defined as the 
time elapsed since the incorporation date of the company. Younger firms are more 
likely to face problems of asymmetric information, as their short track record makes it 
more difficult to judge their quality. We consider as young firm-years (YOUNGit=1) 
within an industry, those firms whose age in year t falls in the lowest quartiles of the 
distribution of the ages of all the firms in that particular industry and year. Similarly, 
we define as middle-aged firm-years (MIDDLEAGEDit=1) within an industry, those 
firms whose age in year t is in the second and third quartiles of the distribution. 
Finally, old firm-years (OLDit=1) are those with age in the highest quartile of the 
distribution6.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 All our results were generally robust to using different cut-off points both for the internal and the 
external financing constraints. Note that all our dummy variables were defined on the full sample, 
which is not the sample actually used in estimation for the reasons documented in footnote 4. 
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3.3 Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of the variables used in our 
regressions. Panel A refers to the manufacturing sector only, whereas Panel B refers 
to our broader sample including a wide range of other industrial sectors. In both 
panels of the Table, column (1) refers to the full sample, columns (2) to (4), to the 
sub-samples based on the cash flow to capital ratio, and columns (5) to (7), to the sub-
samples based on firms’ size7. 
 We can see from both panels of the Table, that when firm-years (indexed by 
it) are classified on the basis of their cash flow to capital ratio (CFit/Ki(t-1)), sales 
growth (∆sit) tends to rise monotonically as we move from firm-years with negative 
cash flow to firm-years with high cash flow. The same happens to the investment to 
capital ratio (Iit /Ki(t-1)) when we focus on the manufacturing sector (Panel A). 
Furthermore, both for the manufacturing sector and our broader sample, assets tend to 
be highest for those firm-years in the middle category. When firm-years are divided 
on the basis of their assets, it is the smallest firm-years which tend to have the highest 
investment to capital ratios, as well as the highest cash flow to capital ratios.  
 Table 2 illustrates the behavior of investment to capital ratios for different 
percentiles of the cash flow to capital ratio. Columns (1) and (2) refer to the 
manufacturing sector and columns (3) and (4), to our broader sample. In both cases, 
we can see that the investment-cash flow relationship is U-shaped: the investment to 
capital ratios reach a minimum when the cash flow to capital ratio is around 0, and 
then increase both when cash flow becomes negative, and when it rises above 0.  
 It is noteworthy that the percentage of firm-years with negative cash flow is 
12.9 percent in our manufacturing sector sample, and 12.7 percent in our broader 
sample. For small firm-years, the corresponding percentages are 14.5 percent in the 
manufacturing sector, and 13.5 percent in our broader sample. For medium-sized 
firm-years, they are 12.7 percent in the manufacturing sector, and 12.8 percent in our 
broader sample; and for large firm-years 12.6 percent in the manufacturing sector, and 
12.4 percent in our broader sample. It appears therefore that the splits of firm-years on 
the basis of the cash flow to capital ratio and real assets are not strongly correlated, as 
a similar percentage of firms with negative cash flow can be found among the small, 
medium, and large firm-years, and as real assets do not grow monotonically with cash 
 12
flow. Dividing firm-years on the basis of their cash flow to capital ratio and on the 
basis of their assets, will therefore not necessarily lead to equal patterns of the 
investment-cash flow sensitivities for financially constrained and unconstrained firm-
years. In the section that follows, we will provide formal tests of how the sensitivities 
change with the degree of internal and external financial constraints faced by firms. 
 
4. Baseline specification and estimation methodology 
4.1 Baseline specification 
We initially estimate the following error-correction specification (see Bond et al., 
2003; Bond and Lombardi, 2006; and Bloom et al., 2007, for a similar specification): 
 
Iit /Ki(t-1) = a0 + a1Ii(t-1)/Ki(t-2) + a2∆sit + a3∆si(t-1) + a4(ki(t-2)-si(t-2)) +  
+a5 CFit /Ki(t-1) + vi + vt + vjt + eit     (1) 
 
where I is the firm’s investment; K, the replacement value of its capital stock, and k, 
its logarithm; s, the logarithm of real sales; and CF, the firm’s cash flow. The 
subscript i indexes firms; j, industries; and t, time, where t=1996-20038. 
Error-correction behavior enters the empirical framework because of 
adjustment costs. In their presence the firm will not immediately adjust its capital 
stock (k) to the target level (s), which is assumed to be a function of sales. We specify 
a dynamic adjustment mechanism between k and s (the details of which are contained 
in Appendix 3 in Guariglia, 2007). To be consistent with error-correction behavior, 
the coefficient associated with the term (ki(t-2)-si(t-2)) should be negative: if capital is 
lower (higher) than its desired level, future investment should be higher (lower).  
The error term in Equation (1) is made up of four components: vi, which is a 
firm-specific component; vt, a time-specific component accounting for possible 
business cycle effects; vjt, a time-specific component which varies across industries, 
accounting for industry-specific shifts in investment demand or expectations 
                                                                                                                                            
7 Summary statistics for the sub-samples based on the coverage ratio and on firms’ age are reported in 
Table A1 in Appendix 2 in Guariglia (2007).  
8 In our manufacturing sample, firms are allocated to one of the following sectors: metals and metal 
goods; other minerals, and mineral products; chemicals and man made fibres; mechanical engineering; 
electrical and instrument engineering; motor vehicles and parts, other transport equipment; food, drink, 
and tobacco; textiles, clothing, leather, and footwear; and others (Blundell et al., 1992). In our broader 
sample, firms are allocated to the following groups: agriculture, forestry, and mining; manufacturing; 
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(Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a); and eit, an idiosyncratic component. We control for 
vi by estimating our equations in first-differences, for vt by including time dummies, 
and for vjt by including industry dummies interacted with time dummies in all our 
specifications.  
When focusing on the differential impact of cash flow on the investment of 
different categories of firms, instead of estimating our investment equations on 
separate sub-samples of firms as in Cleary et al. (2007), we interact the cash flow 
variable in all our specifications with dummy variables indicating the degree of 
internal and external financial constraints faced by the firm. This approach allows us 
to avoid problems of endogenous sample selection; to gain degrees of freedom; and to 
take into consideration the fact that firms can transit between groups. We estimate 
equations of the type: 
 
Iit /Ki(t-1) = a0 + a1Ii(t-1)/Ki(t-2) + a2∆sit + a3∆si(t-1) + a4(ki(t-2)-si(t-2)) +  
+a51 [CFit /Ki(t-1)*CATEGORY1it] + a52 [CFit /Ki(t-1)*CATEGORY2it] +  
a53 [CFit /Ki(t-1)*CATEGORY3it] + vi + vt + vjt + eit,   (2) 
 
where CATEGORY1it, CATEGORY2it, and CATEGORY3it refer in turn to the dummy 
variables based on the firms’ cash flow to capital ratio (NEGCFit, MEDCFit, 
HIGHCFit); to those based on their coverage ratio (NEGCOVit, MEDCOVit; 
HIGHCOVit); on their size (SMALLit, MEDIUMit; LARGEit); and on their age 
(YOUNGit, MIDDLEAGEDit, OLDit).  
 
4.2 Estimation methodology 
We estimate Equations (1) and (2) using the first-difference Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This technique 
takes unobserved firm heterogeneity into account by estimating the equation in first-
differences, and controls for possible endogeneity problems by using the model 
variables lagged two or more periods as instruments9.  
                                                                                                                                            
construction; retail and wholesale; hotels and restaurants; business services; others (which include 
education, health, social work, repairs entertaining, and renting). 
9 Our results were generally robust to using OLS, the within-groups estimator, and the system-GMM 
estimator developed in Blundell and Bond (1998), as well as to interacting all the regressors with the 
CATEGORY dummies, and to including two of the CATEGORY dummies in addition to the interaction 
terms. These estimates are not reported for brevity, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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In order to evaluate whether our model is correctly specified, we use two 
criteria: the Sargan test (also known as J test) and the test for second-order serial 
correlation of the residuals in the differenced equation (m2). If the model is correctly 
specified, the variables in the instrument set should be uncorrelated with the error 
term in Equations (1) and (2). The J statistic tests overidentifying restrictions. Under 
the null of instrument validity, it is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments less the number of parameters. 
The m2 test is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal under the null of no 
second-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals, and provides a further 
check on the specification of the model and on the legitimacy of variables dated t-2 as 
instruments in the differenced equation10. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Investment equations without interactions 
Table 3 presents the estimates of Equation (1). Column (1) refers to the full 
manufacturing sector sample. As expected the error-correction term attracts a negative 
sign, and the sales growth terms are both positive and statistically significant. The 
positive and precisely determined coefficient associated with the cash flow to capital 
ratio suggests that the cost effect prevails over the revenue effect: a drop in cash flow 
is associated with a drop in investment, possibly to avoid the higher borrowing, higher 
repayment costs, and resulting higher risk of default that would follow if investment 
were to be kept unchanged or increased. The point estimate (0.055) indicates that the 
elasticity of investment with respect to cash flow, evaluated at sample means, is 
0.121. A 10 percent increase in cash flow leads therefore to a 1.21 percent increase in 
investment. Neither the Sargan test, nor the m2 test for second-order autocorrelation 
of the differenced residuals indicate problems with the specification of the model or 
the choice of the instruments. 
Column (2) reports the full sample estimates, for our broader sample. Once 
again, the coefficient associated with cash flow (0.038) is positive and precisely 
determined. Compared to the manufacturing sector, however, cash flow has a weaker 
effect on firms’ investment: the elasticity of investment with respect to cash flow is 
                                                 
10 If the undifferenced error terms are i.i.d., then the differenced residuals should display first-order, but 
not second-order serial correlation. Note that neither the J test nor the m2 test allow us to discriminate 
between bad instruments and model specification.  
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now 0.107, compared to 0.121 for the manufacturing sector. This might be explained 
by the fact that agency costs are more substantive for manufacturing firms, as their 
assets are “more specialized” and can less readily “serve as collateral” (Schaller, 
1993). 
In columns (3) and (4), we present the estimates of similar equations on 
samples, which exclude observations with negative cash flow to capital ratio. For the 
manufacturing sector (column 3), the coefficient associated with the cash flow 
variable is now 0.085, whereas the corresponding coefficient for our broader sample 
is 0.043 (column 4). Both coefficients are precisely determined, and larger than those 
reported in columns (1) and (2), although for our broader sample, the difference in the 
coefficients is rather small. This finding suggests that the observations with negative 
cash flow have lower (and possibly negative) investment-cash flow sensitivities than 
the other observations (see Allayannis and Mozumdar, 2004, for a similar finding). 
Next, we will evaluate how exactly the investment-cash flow sensitivities 
differ across various sub-groups of firm-years. 
 
5.2 Investment equations with interactions based on the degree of internal 
financial constraints faced by firms  
Table 4 presents the estimates of Equation (2), where the interaction terms are based 
on the cash flow to capital ratio (columns 1 and 2, respectively for the manufacturing 
sector and our broader sample), and on the coverage ratio (columns 3 and 4, 
respectively for the manufacturing sector and our broader sample). Focusing on 
columns (1) and (2), we can see that the coefficient associated with cash flow is 
negative for firm-years with negative cash flow. Column (1) suggests that a 10 
percent increase in cash flow is associated with a 4.23 percent drop in investment. The 
corresponding figure for column (2) is 1.69 percent. These figures indicate that for 
firms with negative cash flow, the revenue effect prevails over the cost effect. For 
these firms, a large share of any loan would have to be used to pay existing debts or 
cover fixed costs, i.e. to try and make cash flow positive. Therefore, in the presence of 
a falling cash flow, these firms would have to increase their investment, in order to 
generate sufficient revenue to achieve this goal. 
Columns (1) and (2) also suggest that cash flow does not have a precisely 
determined effect on the investment of those firm-years characterized by a moderate 
level of cash flow to capital. On the other hand, it plays a positive and significant 
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effect on the investment of firm-years with high cash flow, for which the cost effect is 
likely to prevail over the revenue effect. For these firm-years, focusing on the 
manufacturing sector, a 10 percent rise in cash flow is associated with a 2.89 percent 
rise in investment. The corresponding figure for our broader sample is 2.83 percent. 
These results are in line with the findings in Cleary et al. (2007), who find a U-shaped 
investment-cash flow relationship, and with those in KZ (1997), according to which 
the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is highest for the least financially 
constrained firms.  
 When the coverage ratio is used to differentiate the effects of cash flow on 
firms’ investment, we obtain similar results as above for the manufacturing sector 
(column 3). Yet, when our broader sample is considered (column 4), cash flow 
attracts a positive and significant coefficient both for firm-years with middle-sized 
and high coverage ratio. 
Table 4 also reports p-values associated with χ2 tests aimed at assessing 
whether the impact of cash flow of investment is equal across various categories of 
firms-years. The results suggest that the hypothesis is always rejected when firm-
years with negative cash flow/coverage ratio (which exhibit negative sensitivities) are 
compared with firm-years with high cash flow/coverage ratio (which exhibit positive 
sensitivities). The hypothesis is also rejected when firm-years with negative coverage 
ratio are compared with firm-years with medium-sized coverage ratio, and when 
manufacturing firm-years with medium-sized cash flow/coverage ratio are compared 
with manufacturing firm-years with high cash flow/coverage ratio. 
 
5.3 Investment equations with interactions based on the degree of external 
financial constraints faced by firms 
Table 5 presents the results of the estimates of Equation (2) when firm-years are 
differentiated into small, medium, and large (columns 1 and 2, respectively for the 
manufacturing sector and our broader sample) and into young, middle-aged, and old 
(columns 3 and 4, respectively for the manufacturing sector and our broader sample), 
i.e. on the basis of the degree of external financial constraints that they face.  
In column (1), both small and medium-sized firm-years display a positive and 
precisely determined sensitivity of investment to cash flow, larger for the former 
(0.10) than for the latter (0.05). The elasticities evaluated at sample means suggest 
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that a 10 percent rise in cash flow is associated with a 2.82 percent rise in investment 
for small firms, and a 1.10 percent rise for medium-sized firms. A similar pattern can 
be observed in column (2), where the coefficients are respectively 0.08 and 0.03 for 
small and medium-sized firm-years, indicating that a 10 percent rise in cash flow 
leads to a 2.52 percent rise in investment for small firms, and to a 0.84 percent rise for 
medium-sized firm-years. For large firm-years, the coefficient associated with cash 
flow is poorly determined in both columns. These findings show that the cost effect 
prevails for small and medium-sized firm-years, and that the former are more 
sensitive to asymmetric information issues than latter. For large firm-years, on the 
other hand, a drop in cash flow has no effect on investment, possibly because it is 
always possible for them to obtain financing through bank loans or the equity market. 
 When firm-years are split on the basis of their age (columns 3 and 4), the 
coefficients associated with cash flow are once again only significant for the youngest 
and middle-aged firm years, and generally larger for the former.  
Table 5 also reports p-values associated with χ2 tests aimed at assessing 
whether the impact of cash flow of investment is equal across various categories of 
firms-years. As expected, the results suggest that the hypothesis is always rejected 
when small/young firm-years are compared with large/old firm-years. It is rejected in 
three cases out of four when middle-sized/middle-aged firm-years are compared with 
large/old firm-years, and except in one case, cannot be rejected when small/young 
firm-years are compared with middle-sized/middle aged firm-years. 
It appears therefore that, although also significant for middle-sized and 
middle-aged firm-years, the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is larger for the 
smallest and youngest firm-years, which are more prone to facing asymmetric 
information problems. The estimates in this Table are in line with the findings in FHP 
(1988), according to which firms more likely to face financial constraints exhibit 
higher sensitivities of investment to cash flow11.  
These findings have significant policy implications: the fact that smaller and 
younger firms exhibit a higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow suggests that in 
order to make the small business community thrive, policies aimed at making the 
                                                 
11 The fact that in this Table the investment-cash flow sensitivities are never negative and precisely 
determined can be explained by considering that the percentage of firms with negative cash flow is 
relatively small in all sub-groups of firms.  
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access to finance easier for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are likely to 
be particularly effective. 
Our results so far suggest that the different conclusions reached by FHP 
(1988) and KZ (1997) about whether higher sensitivities of investment to cash flow 
can be interpreted as evidence that firms are more financially constrained, are 
probably due to the to the different criteria used in their studies to partition their 
sample. We next analyze the sensitivities of investment to cash flow when the sample 
is split on the basis of combinations of various degrees of internal and external 
financial constraints. 
 
5.5 Investment equations with interactions based on various combinations of 
internal and external financial constraints faced by firms 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 present the results of the estimation of Equation (1) 
when the effects of cash flow on investment are differentiated across firm-years 
facing various combinations of internal and external financial constraints, i.e. small, 
medium, and large firm-years with negative cash flow; small, medium, and large 
firm-years with medium cash flow; and small, medium, and large firm-years with 
high cash flow. 
 Column (1) reports the estimates for the manufacturing sector. It appears that 
cash flow attracts a positive and statistically significant effect only for those small and 
medium-sized firm-years with relatively high cash flow. The coefficient for the 
former (0.14) is higher than that for the latter (0.09), and higher than the 
corresponding coefficient on cash flow for small firm-years reported in column (1) of 
Table 5 (0.10). The elasticities evaluated at sample means suggest that a 10 percent 
rise in cash flow is associated with a 6.81 percent rise in investment for small firms 
with high cash flow, and with a 3.82 percent rise for medium-sized firms with high 
cash flow. These are sizeable effects. The J and m2 tests do not indicate problems 
with the specification of the model and/or the instruments chosen.  
 Column (2) reports the estimates for our broader sample. Once again, it is the 
small firm-years with relatively high cash flow that display the highest sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow (0.07). For these firms a 10 percent increase in cash flow is 
associated with a 4.53 rise in investment. As in column (1), cash flow attracts a 
positive and significant coefficient also for the medium-sized firm-years with 
relatively high cash flow. This coefficient (0.04) is however smaller than that for 
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small firm-years, and indicates that a 10 percent rise in cash flow is followed by a 
2.51 percent rise in investment. Finally, in this specification, we can also observe a 
negative and significant coefficient for medium-sized firm-years with negative cash 
flow. 
 Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 presents robustness tests in which cash flow 
and size are respectively replaced with the coverage ratio and age as sample 
separation criteria. Column (3) presents estimates for the manufacturing sector. Like 
in column (1), it is only those young and middle-aged firm-years with relatively high 
coverage ratio that display positive and significant sensitivities of investment to cash 
flow. The sensitivities amount to 0.16 and 0.09 respectively for the two types of firm-
years. Column (4) refers to our broader sample. The results are similar to those 
reported in column (2). 
We also perform tests aimed at assessing whether the impact of cash flow on 
investment is equal across various categories of firms-years. The results, which we do 
not report for brevity, suggest that the hypothesis is always rejected when medium-
sized/middle aged firm-years with negative cash flow/coverage ratio (which exhibit 
negative sensitivities) are compared with small/young and middle-sized/middle-aged 
firms with high cash flow/coverage ratio (which show positive sensitivities). It is also 
rejected when the comparison is performed with large/old firm-years with high cash 
flow (which also display positive sensitivities). The hypothesis is rejected in the 
majority of cases when small/young and medium-sized/middle aged firm-years with 
high cash flow/coverage ratio are compared with large/old firm-years with high cash 
flow/coverage ratio, as the former typically exhibit positive sensitivities, while the 
latter show insignificant sensitivities.  
The results in Table 6 can be interpreted as follows. External and internal 
financial constraints often have opposite effects on the sensitivities of investment to 
cash flow. For internally financially constrained firms, the revenue effect is likely to 
prevail, leading to a negative sensitivity of investment to cash flow. On the other 
hand, for those externally financially constrained firms, which are not internally 
constrained, the cost effect is likely to prevail, leading to a positive sensitivity. Thus, 
when the two types of constraints are combined, the sensitivities are the highest for 
those firm-years for which the cost effect dominates, i.e. for those which are 
unconstrained internally (having high cash flow and/or coverage ratios), and 
constrained externally (being small/medium-sized and/or young/middle-aged).  
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The fact that investment at firm-years which are constrained both internally 
and externally (being small/medium-sized or young/middle-aged and having a 
negative cash flow/coverage ratio) does not seem to be affected by cash flow can be 
explained by considering that a negative cash flow/coverage ratio leads to a negative 
sensitivity (given the prevalence of the revenue effect), whereas being small/medium-
sized or young/middle-aged leads to a positive sensitivity (given the prevalence of the 
cost effect). These two contrasting effects might be offsetting each other, leading to a 
poorly determined coefficient for small/young and middle-sized/middle-aged firm-
years with negative cash-flow/coverage ratios. For small/young firm-years with 
negative cash flow/coverage ratio, this result could also be explained by considering 
that these firm-years are particularly likely to be financially distressed. They might 
therefore have reached the minimum level of investment necessary to carry on 
production: further reductions in investment would therefore be impossible, even in 
response to declines in cash flow. Financially distressed firms might also be required 
by their creditors to use their cash flow to meet interest payments and/or improve the 
liquidity of their balance sheet (Fazzari et al., 2000; Allayannis and Monumbar, 2004; 
Cleary et al., 2007).  
Investment at firm-years with medium-sized cash flow does not seem to be 
affected by changes in cash flow, whatever the degree of external financial constraints 
faced by the firms. As before, for small/medium-sized and young/middle-aged firm-
years, this can be explained by considering that these firms might be experiencing 
both a cost effect, driven by the external dimension of their financial constraints (i.e. 
their small/medium size/age), and a revenue effect, driven by the internal dimension 
(i.e. the medium-sized cash flow/coverage ratio), whereby the two offset each other. 
Finally, large/old firm-years always exhibit insignificant sensitivities, probably 
because they do not suffer from financial constraints: even if they are internally 
constrained, they are always able to access external funds. 
In the light of these results, in order to make an economy thrive in the short-
run, public policies should endeavour to make access to finance easier especially for 
those SMEs characterized by relatively high levels of internal funds. It is in fact those 
SMEs that will convert this additional finance into additional investment. Funding 
low cash flow/coverage ratio SMEs could be beneficial in the medium-run, as these 
firms could initially use the additional funding for debt repayment rather than 
investment, which could provide a platform for greater future investment. 
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6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have used a panel of mainly unquoted UK firms, operating in a 
broad range of industrial sectors, to test whether internal and external financial 
constraints faced by firms have different effects on their sensitivity of investment to 
cash flow. Using data on unquoted firms has provided us with a unique opportunity to 
construct measures of financial constraints displaying a wide degree of variation 
across observations. Instead of using the traditional Q-model of investment in 
estimation, we have used an error-correction specification, which has permitted us to 
by-pass to a certain extent the criticism according to which cash flow might affect 
investment, simply because it accounts for investment opportunities, not properly 
measured by Q. Furthermore, in addition to analyzing how the sensitivities of 
investment to cash flow differ at firms facing different degrees of internal financial 
constraints on the one hand, and different degrees of external financial constraints, on 
the other, we have also focused on the effects of various combinations of internal and 
external financial constraints on the sensitivities, trying to identify the combinations 
leading to the highest sensitivities. 
According to our results, which were generally robust to considering only the 
manufacturing sector or a broader range of industries, when the sample is split on the 
basis of the level of internal funds available to the firms, the relationship between 
investment and cash flow is U-shaped. On the other hand, the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow tends to increase monotonically with the degree of external 
financial constraints faced by firms. These findings suggest that the different 
conclusions reached by FHP (1988) and KZ (1997) about whether higher sensitivities 
of investment to cash flow can be interpreted as evidence that firms are more 
financially constrained, are probably due to the different criteria used in their studies 
to partition their sample. Finally, combining the internal with the external financial 
constraints, we find that the sensitivities are the highest for those externally 
financially constrained firms that have a relatively high level of internal funds.  
Although our paper provides a reconciliation for the contradictory findings in 
FHP (1988) and KZ (1999), it does not deal with the other challenges that have been 
addressed in the literature to the hypothesis that a significant coefficient on cash flow 
in an investment reduced form regression can be seen as an indication of the existence 
of financial constraints. Authors such as Alti (2003) and Boyle and Guthrie (2003), 
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for instance, construct theoretical models respectively showing that unconstrained 
firms can plausibly exhibit the sensitivities documented in the literature, and that 
firms facing (by construction) identical constraints can nevertheless exhibit different 
sensitivities due to differences in investment flexibility. The question of whether high 
sensitivities of investment to cash flow can be seen as indicators of financial 
constraints remains therefore a controversial question, which will undoubtedly 
generate future research.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Manufacturing sector 
 
 
  
All firm-
years 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
 
Firm-years 
such that 
NEGCFit=1 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
Firm-years 
such that. 
MEDCFit=1 
 
 
 
(3) 
 
Firm-years 
such that 
HIGHCFit=1 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
Firm-years 
such that 
SMALLit=1 
 
 
 
(5) 
 
Firm-years  
such that 
MEDIUMit=1 
 
 
 
(6) 
 
Firm-years 
such that 
LARGEit=1 
 
 
 
(7) 
Real assets 388.30 
(4294.0) 
 
325.29 
(1652.6) 
417.26 
(4173.5) 
347.44 
(5424.0) 
11.782 
(4.70) 
51.533 
(31.61) 
983.18 
(7038.2) 
Iit / Ki(t-1) 
 
 
0.168 
(0.26) 
0.119 
(0.27) 
0.145 
(0.21) 
0.255 
(0.36) 
0.179 
(0.28) 
0.169 
(0.27) 
0.162 
(0.25) 
∆sit 
 
0.030 
(0.22) 
 
-0.096 
(0.27) 
-0.004 
(0.19) 
0.072 
(0.22) 
0.009 
(0.23) 
-0.00003 
(0.21) 
0.004 
(0.21) 
(ki(t-2)-si(t-2)) 
 
-1.576 
(0.89) 
-1.587 
(0.88) 
-1.330 
(0.76) 
-2.201 
(0.88) 
-1.976 
(0.94) 
-1.601 
(0.87) 
-1.376 
(0.81) 
 
CFit / Ki(t-1) 
 
0.371 
(0.71) 
 
-0.331 
(0.45) 
 
0.219 
(0.13) 
 
1.134 
(1.00) 
 
0.481 
(0.89) 
 
0.357 
(0.68) 
 
0.342 
(0.66) 
 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
 
 
39270 
 
 
 
 
5096 
 
 
24599 
 
 
9575 
 
 
6063 
 
 
18753 
 
 
14454 
 
Notes: The Table reports sample means. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. The subscript i indexes 
firms, and the subscript t, time, where t=1996-2003. I represents the firm’s investment; K, the replacement value of 
its capital stock; s, the logarithm of its sales; k, the logarithm of its capital stock; and CF, its cash flow. NEGCFit is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i has a negative cash flow to capital ratio at time t, and equal to 0, otherwise. 
MEDCFit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i has a positive cash flow to capital ratio in year t, which falls 
below the 75th percentile of the distribution of the cash flow to capital ratios of all firms belonging to the same 
industry as firm i in year t. HIGHCFit is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i’s cash flow to capital ratio is positive in year 
t, and above the 75th percentile of the distribution of the cash flow to capital ratios of all firms belonging to the 
same industry as firm i in year t, and equal to 0 otherwise. SMALLit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s total 
real assets are in the lowest quartile of the distribution of the total assets of all firms belonging to the same industry 
as firm i in year t, and 0, otherwise. MEDIUMit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s total assets are in the 
second and third quartiles of the distribution of the total assets of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i 
in year t, and 0, otherwise. LARGEit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s total assets are in the highest quartile 
of the distribution of the total assets of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in year t, and 0, otherwise. 
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Panel B: Broader sample 
 
 
  
All firm-
years 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
 
Firm-years 
such that 
NEGCFit=1 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
 
Firm-years 
such that. 
MEDCFit=1 
 
 
 
(3) 
 
Firm-years 
such that 
HIGHCFit=1 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
Firm-years 
such that 
SMALLit=1 
 
 
 
(5) 
 
Firm-years  
such that 
MEDIUMit=1 
 
 
 
(6) 
 
Firm-years 
such that 
LARGEit=1 
 
 
 
(7) 
Real assets 323.806 
(4639.1) 
287.43 
(4396.0) 
331.81 
(3912.0) 
321.739 
(6303.0) 
8.542 
(4.21) 
37.453 
(21.92) 
880.307 
(7855.6) 
 
Iit / Ki(t-1) 
 
 
0.194 
(0.36) 
 
0.158 
(0.39) 
 
0.158 
(0.27) 
 
0.310 
(0.52) 
 
0.207 
(0.40) 
 
0.192 
(0.36) 
 
0.190 
(0.35) 
 
∆sit 
 
 
0.030 
(0.26) 
 
 
-0.074 
(0.32) 
 
0.024 
(0.22) 
 
0.103 
(0.27) 
 
 
0.034 
(0.26) 
 
0.024 
(0.26) 
 
0.036 
(0.25) 
(ki(t-2)-si(t-2)) 
 
-1.789 
(1.34) 
-1.811 
(1.30) 
-1.445 
(1.23) 
-2.714 
(1.20) 
-2.220 
(1.16) 
-1.778 
(1.30) 
-1.571 
(1.42) 
 
CFit / Ki(t-1) 
 
0.548 
(1.43) 
 
-0.586 
(0.96) 
 
0.261 
(0.20) 
 
1.951 
(2.30) 
 
0.688 
(1.61) 
 
0.522 
(1.41) 
 
0.508 
(1.36) 
 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
 
 
124590 
 
 
15873 
 
 
79612 
 
 
29105 
 
 
23045 
 
 
58426 
 
 
43119 
 
Notes: The Table reports sample means. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. The subscript i indexes 
firms, and the subscript t, time, where t=1996-2003. I represents the firm’s investment; K, the replacement value of 
its capital stock; s, the logarithm of its sales; k, the logarithm of its capital stock; and CF, its cash flow. NEGCFit is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i has a negative cash flow to capital ratio at time t, and equal to 0, otherwise. 
MEDCFit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i has a positive cash flow to capital ratio in year t, which falls 
below the 75th percentile of the distribution of the cash flow to capital ratios of all firms belonging to the same 
industry as firm i in year t. HIGHCFit is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i’s cash flow to capital ratio is positive in year 
t, and above the 75th percentile of the distribution of the cash flow to capital ratios of all firms belonging to the 
same industry as firm i in year t, and equal to 0 otherwise. SMALLit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s total 
real assets are in the lowest quartile of the distribution of the total assets of all firms belonging to the same industry 
as firm i in year t, and 0, otherwise. MEDIUMit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s total assets are in the 
second and third quartiles of the distribution of the total assets of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i 
in year t, and 0, otherwise. LARGEit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s total assets are in the highest quartile 
of the distribution of the total assets of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in year t, and 0, otherwise. 
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Table 2: Is the investment curve U-shaped? 
 
Manufacturing Manufacturing 
 
Broader sample Broader sample  
CFit/Ki(t-1) 
percentiles   
Mean CFit/Ki(t-1) 
 
(1) 
 
 
Mean Iit/Ki(t-1) 
 
(2) 
 
 
Mean CFit/Ki(t-1) 
 
(3) 
 
Mean Iit/Ki(t-1) 
 
(4) 
<=1% <= (-1.03) 0.23 <= (-2.02) 0.36 
2%-5% (-1.03) – (-0.24) 0.15 (-2.02) – (-0.34) 0.22 
6%-10% (-0.24) – (-0.048) 0.12 (-0.34) – (-0.005) 0.14 
11%-25% (-0.048) – 0.11 0.10 (-0.005) – 0.10 0.10 
26%-50% 0.11 – 0.24 0.13 0.10 – 0.26 0.14 
51%-75% 0.24 – 0.49 0.20 0.26 – 0.63 0.22 
76%-90% 0.49 – 0.99 0.25 0.63- 1.52 0.31 
90%-95% 0.99 – 1.53 0.33 1.52 – 2.66 0.41 
95%-99% 1.53 – 3.54 0.37 2.66 – 7.29 0.49 
>99% > 3.54 0.40 >7.29 0.57 
 
Notes: The subscript i indexes firms, and the subscript t, time, where t=1996-2003. I represents the 
firm’s investment; K, the replacement value of its capital stock; and CF, its cash flow. 
 
 
Table 3: The effects of cash flow on investment: an error-correction approach 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Iit / Ki(t-1) 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
Manuf. 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
Broader 
sample 
 
(2) 
 
 
Excluding 
obs. with  
CFit / Ki(t-1)<0 
 
Manuf. 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
Excluding 
obs. with  
CFit / Ki(t-1)<0 
 
Broader 
sample 
 
(4) 
 
 
Ii(t-1) / Ki(t-2) 
 
 
-0.093** 
(0.04) 
 
-0.056** 
(0.02) 
 
-0.131** 
(0.05) 
 
-0.073** 
(0.03) 
∆sit 
 
0.357** 
(0.17) 
0.425** 
(0.18) 
0.564*** 
(0.19) 
0.451** 
(0.21) 
∆si(t-1) 
 
0.241*** 
(0.06) 
0.205*** 
(0.04) 
0.279*** 
(0.07) 
0.215*** 
(0.05) 
(ki(t-2)-si(t-2)) 
 
-0.218*** 
(0.06) 
-0.159*** 
(0.04) 
-0.254*** 
(0.08) 
-0.178*** 
(0.05) 
CFit / Ki(t-1) 
 
0.055*** 
(0.02) 
0.038*** 
(0.01) 
0.084*** 
(0.03) 
0.043*** 
(0.01) 
 
m2 
 
-0.91 
 
-0.08 
 
-1.37 
 
-0.02 
J  (p-value) 
Sample size 
0.81 
39270 
0.02 
124590 
0.79 
30788 
0.11 
97551 
 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. The figures reported in 
parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies 
were included in all specifications. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to 
heteroskedasticity. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying 
restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Instruments in both columns are (ki(t-2)-
si(t-2)), Ii(t-2) /Ki(t-3), ∆si(t-2), CFi(t-2) /Ki(t-3) and further lags. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry 
dummies were always included in the instrument set. Also see Notes to Table 1. * indicates significance at the 
10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4: The effects of cash flow on investment: distinguishing firm-years on the 
basis of the degree of internal financial constraints that they face 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Iit / Ki(t-1) 
CF- 
interactions 
 
Manuf. 
 
 
(1) 
CF-
interactions 
 
Broader 
sample 
 
(2) 
COV-
interactions 
 
Manuf. 
 
 
(3) 
COV-
interactions 
 
Broader 
sample 
 
(4) 
 
Ii(t-1) / Ki(t-2) 
 
 
-0.070** 
(0.03) 
 
-0.064** 
(0.02) 
 
-0.105** 
(0.05) 
 
-0.048 
(0.03) 
∆sit 
 
0.212** 
(0.09) 
0.509*** 
(0.13) 
0.322** 
(0.15) 
0.422*** 
(0.14) 
∆si(t-1) 
 
0.222*** 
(0.04) 
0.214*** 
(0.04) 
0.255*** 
(0.07) 
0.187*** 
(0.05) 
(ki(t-2)-si(t-2)) 
 
-0.198*** 
(0.05) 
-0.165*** 
(0.04) 
-0.228*** 
(0.07) 
-0.135** 
(0.06) 
(CFit /Ki(t-1))*NEGCFit 
 
(CFit /Ki(t-1))* MEDCFit 
 
-0.152** 
(0.07) 
-0.056 
(0.07) 
-0.047* 
(0.027) 
-0.046 
(0.06) 
  
(CFit /Ki(t-1))* HIGHCFit 
 
0.065*** 
(0.02) 
0.045*** 
(0.01) 
  
(CFit /Ki(t-1))*NEGCOVit 
 
  -0.195** 
(0.097) 
-0.062** 
(0.03) 
(CFit /Ki(t-1))*MEDCOVit 
 
  0.021 
(0.04) 
0.078** 
(0.03) 
(CFit /Ki(t-1))*HIGHCOVit 
 
  0.097*** 
(0.04) 
 
0.065*** 
(0.02) 
H0: Impact of CFit /Ki(t-1) on Iit / Ki(t-1) same across 
firm-years with negative and medium-sized 
CFit/COVit (p-value) 
 
0.41 0.99 0.05* 0.002*** 
H0: Impact of CFit /Ki(t-1) on Iit / Ki(t-1) same across 
firm-years with negative and large CFit/COVit (p-
value) 
 
0.0085*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.0005*** 
H0: Impact of CFit /Ki(t-1) on Iit / Ki(t-1) same across 
firm-years with medium-sized and large CFit/COVit 
(p-value) 
0.06* 0.11 0.04** 0.63 
 
m2 
 
-0.89 
 
-0.28 
 
-0.37 
 
-0.85 
J (p-value) 0.522 0.132 0.30 0.05 
Sample size 39270 
 
124590 
 
30087 
 
91886 
 
 
Notes: NEGCOVit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i has a negative coverage ratio at time t, and equal to 0, 
otherwise. MEDCOVit is a dummy  equal to 1 if firm i has a positive coverage ratio in year t, which falls below the 
75th percentile of the distribution of the coverage ratios of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in year 
t. HIGHCOVit is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i’s coverage ratio is positive in year t, and above the 75th percentile of 
the distribution of the coverage ratios of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in year t, and equal to 0 
otherwise. All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. The figures reported in 
parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies 
were included in all specifications. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to 
heteroskedasticity. Instruments in columns (1) and (2) are (ki(t-2)-si(t-2)), Ii(t-2) /Ki(t-3), ∆si(t-2), CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(NEGFCi(t-
2)), CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(MEDCFi(t-2)), and CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(HIGHCFi(t-2)) and further lags. Instruments in columns (3) and 
(4) are (ki(t-2)-si(t-2)), Ii(t-2) /Ki(t-3), ∆si(t-2), CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(NEGCOVi(t-2)), CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(MEDCOVi(t-2)), and CFi(t-
2)/Ki(t-3) *(HIGHCOVi(t-2)) and further lags. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies 
were always included in the instrument set. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The J statistic is a test of the 
overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. The numbers in the 
rows testing whether the impact of CFit /Ki(t-1) on Iit / Ki(t-1) is the same across various categories of firm-years are 
the p-values associated with χ2 tests for general restrictions. Also see Notes to Table 1. * indicates significance at 
the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 5: The effects of cash flow on investment: distinguishing firm-years on the 
basis of the degree of external financial constraints that they face  
 
 
Dependent Variable: Iit / Ki(t-1) 
Size- 
interactions 
 
Manuf. 
 
 
(1) 
Size-
interactions 
 
Broader 
sample 
 
(2) 
Age-
interactions 
 
Manuf. 
 
 
(3) 
Age-
interactions 
 
Broader 
sample 
 
(4) 
 
Ii(t-1) / Ki(t-2) 
 
 
-0.133*** 
(0.05) 
 
-0.074*** 
(0.02) 
 
-0.134*** 
(0.04) 
 
-0.062** 
(0.02) 
∆sit 
 
0.561*** 
(0.19) 
0.509*** 
(0.16) 
0.506*** 
(0.143) 
0.388** 
(0.16) 
∆si(t-1) 
 
0.285*** 
(0.06) 
0.231*** 
(0.04) 
0.291*** 
(0.06) 
0.218*** 
(0.04) 
(ki(t-2)-si(t-2)) 
 
-0.261*** 
(0.06) 
-0.188*** 
(0.04) 
-0.268*** 
(0.06) 
-0.175*** 
(0.04) 
(CFit /Ki(t-1))*SMALLit 
 
(CFit /Ki(t-1))* MEDIUMit 
 
0.105*** 
(0.03) 
0.052*** 
(0.02) 
0.076*** 
(0.02) 
0.031*** 
(0.01) 
  
(CFit /Ki(t-1))* LARGEit 
 
0.005 
(0.03) 
0.018 
(0.01) 
  
(CFit /Ki(t-1))*YOUNGit 
 
  0.065** 
(0.03) 
0.048*** 
(0.01) 
(CFit /Ki(t-1))*MIDDLEAGEDit 
 
  0.053** 
(0.02) 
0.040*** 
(0.01) 
(CFit /Ki(t-1))*OLDit 
 
  -0.016 
(0.03) 
 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
H0: Impact of CFit /Ki(t-1) on Iit / Ki(t-1) same across 
small/young and medium-sized/middle-aged firm-
years (p-value) 
 
0.10 0.01*** 0.70 0.49 
H0: Impact of CFit /Ki(t-1) on Iit / Ki(t-1) same across 
small/young and large/old firm-years (p-value) 
 
0.013** 0.005*** 0.04** 0.0009*** 
H0: Impact of CFit /Ki(t-1) on Iit / Ki(t-1) same across 
firm-years with medium-sized/middle-aged and 
large/old firm-years (p-value) 
0.08* 0.34 0.03** 0.003*** 
 
m2 
 
-1.17 
 
-0.20 
 
-0.93 
 
0.019 
J  (p-value) 0.88 0.03 0.76 0.05 
Sample size 
 
39270 
 
124581 
 
39270 
 
124581 
 
 
Notes: YOUNGit is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i’s age is in the lowest quartile of the distribution of the ages of all 
firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in year t, and 0, otherwise. MIDDLEAGEDit is a dummy equal to 1 
if firm i’s age is in the second and third quartiles of the distribution of the ages of all firms belonging to the same 
industry as firm i in year t, and 0, otherwise. OLDit is a variable equal to 1 if firm i’s age is in the highest quartile 
of the distribution of the ages of all firms belonging to the same industry as firm i in year t, and 0, otherwise. All 
specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. The figures reported in parentheses are 
asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were included in 
all specifications. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. Instruments in 
columns (1) and (2) are (ki(t-2)-si(t-2)), Ii(t-2) /Ki(t-3), ∆si(t-2), CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(SMALLi(t-2)), CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(MEDIUMi(t-2)), 
and CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(LARGEi(t-2)) and further lags. Instruments in columns (3) and (4) are (ki(t-2)-si(t-2)), Ii(t-2) /Ki(t-3), ∆si(t-2), CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(YOUNGi(t-2)), CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(MIDDLEAGEDi(t-2)), and CFi(t-2)/Ki(t-3) *(OLDi(t-2)) and further 
lags. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included in the instrument 
set. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The J statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed 
as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. The numbers in the rows testing whether the impact of CFit 
/Ki(t-1) on Iit / Ki(t-1) is the same across various categories of firm-years are the p-values associated with χ2 tests for 
general restrictions. Also see Notes to Table 1. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance 
at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 6: The effects of cash flow on investment: distinguishing firm-years on the 
basis of combinations of different degrees of internal and external financial 
constraints 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Iit / Ki(t-1) 
 
Cash flow  
and size 
interactions 
 
Manuf. 
 
 
(1) 
 
Cash flow 
and size 
interactions 
 
Broader 
sample 
 
(2) 
 
Coverage 
ratio and age 
interactions 
 
Manuf. 
 
 
(3) 
 
Coverage 
ratio and age 
interactions 
 
Broader 
sample 
 
(4) 
 
Ii(t-1) / Ki(t-2) 
 
 
-0.100** 
(0.05) 
 
-0.093*** 
(0.03) 
 
-0.076 
(0.06) 
 
-0.095*** 
(0.03) 
∆sit 
 
0.323** 
(0.15) 
0.460*** 
(0.14) 
0.157 
(0.19) 
0.505*** 
(0.14) 
∆si(t-1) 
 
0.247*** 
(0.06) 
0.262*** 
(0.04) 
0.220** 
(0.08) 
0.257*** 
(0.06) 
(ki(t-2)-si(t-2)) 
 
 
-0.239*** 
(0.07) 
-0.232*** 
(0.05) 
-0.201** 
(0.08) 
-0.225*** 
(0.06) 
(CFit/Ki(t-1))*(NEGCFit/NEGCOVit)* 
(SMALLit/YOUNGit) 
 
(CFit/Ki(t-1))*(NEGCFit/NEGCOVit)* 
(MEDIUMit/MIDDLEAGEDit) 
 
-0.194 
(0.18) 
 
-0.167 
(0.13) 
-0.077 
(0.09) 
 
-0.090** 
(0.03) 
-0.106 
(0.16) 
 
-0.177 
(0.13) 
0.014 
(0.11) 
 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
(CFit/Ki(t-1))*(NEGCFit/NEGCOVit)* 
(LARGEit/OLDit) 
 
-0.079 
(0.14) 
0.049 
(0.06) 
-0.050 
(0.20) 
-0.132 
(0.10) 
(CFit/Ki(t-1))*(MEDCFit/MEDCOVit)* 
(SMALLit/YOUNGit) 
 
0.271 
(0.21) 
0.196 
(0.17) 
0.043 
(0.07) 
0.048 
(0.04) 
(CFit/Ki(t-1))*(MEDCFit/MEDCOVit)* 
(MEDIUMit/MIDDLEAGEDit) 
 
-0.024 
(0.12) 
-0.091 
(0.07) 
0.018 
(0.05) 
0.071** 
(0.03) 
(CFit/Ki(t-1))*(MEDCFit/MEDCOVit)* 
(LARGEit/OLDit) 
 
0.089 
(0.10) 
-0.102 
(0.07) 
-0.014 
(0.13) 
0.018 
(0.05) 
(CFit/Ki(t-1))*(HIGHCFit/HIGHCOVit)* 
(SMALLit/YOUNGit) 
 
0.143*** 
(0.03) 
0.074*** 
(0.02) 
0.158** 
(0.06) 
0.088*** 
(0.03) 
(CFit/Ki(t-1))*(HIGHCFit/HIGHCOVit)* 
(MEDIUMit/MIDDLEAGEDit) 
 
0.091*** 
(0.03) 
0.040*** 
(0.01) 
0.095** 
(0.04) 
0.058** 
(0.02) 
(CFit/Ki(t-1))*(HIGHCFit/HIGHCOVit)* 
(LARGEit/OLDit) 
 
0.059 
(0.04) 
0.019 
(0.016) 
-0.010 
(0.06) 
-0.0006 
(0.02) 
 
m2 
 
-0.893 
 
0.542 
 
-0.123 
 
0.090 
J  (p-value) 
Sample size 
0.967 
39270 
0.542 
124590 
0.609 
30083 
0.418 
91877 
Notes: All specifications were estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. The figures reported in 
parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with industry dummies 
were included in all specifications. Standard errors and test statistics are asymptotically robust to 
heteroskedasticity. Instruments in all columns are (ki(t-2)-si(t-2)), Ii(t-2) /Ki(t-3), ∆si(t-2) and further lags, together with the 
relevant multiple interaction terms lagged twice or more. Time dummies and time dummies interacted with 
industry dummies were always included in the instrument set. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the 
first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The J 
statistic is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. 
Also see Notes to Tables 1, 4, and 5. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
